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ABSTRACT: Prominent reasons why people make more or less money in the labor
market include personal characteristics of the employee (e.g., human capital), job
characteristics, and characteristics of the employer (e.g., firm size). An emerging
empirical literature suggests that one hitherto overlooked firm characteristic
matters, too: Employers who are in business for a longer period of time tend to pay
higher wages. Using a unique set of linked employer-employee data we present
the first empirical evidence on this firm age - wage nexus for Germany. We find
that older firms pay on average higher wages for workers with the same broadly
defined degree of formal qualification. This firm age differential vanishes after
controlling for further worker characteristics and other firm characteristics besides
age; if anything, younger firms pay more ceteris paribus.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Zu den häufig genannten Gründen, warum Arbeitnehmer
mehr oder weniger verdienen, zählen u.a. persönliche Charakteristika (wie
Humankapital), Arbeitsplatzmerkmale und Arbeitgebercharakteristika (wie Firmen-
größe). Eine zunehmende empirische Literatur deutet darauf hin, dass ein bisher
übersehenes Firmenmerkmal ebenfalls eine Rolle spielt: Arbeitgeber, deren Firma
schon länger besteht, zahlen tendenziell höhere Löhne. Unter Verwendung eines
einzigartigen Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Datensatzes präsentieren wir erste empi-
rische Ergebnisse für Deutschland zu diesem Zusammenhang. Wir stellen fest,
dass innerhalb vergleichbarer Arbeitnehmergruppen ältere Firmen im Durchschnitt
höhere Löhne zahlen. Dieser Firmenalterunterschied verschwindet jedoch, wenn
für weitere Arbeitnehmer- und Firmenmerkmale kontrolliert wird; falls überhaupt
ein Unterschied besteht, dann zahlen jüngere Firmen ceteris paribus mehr.
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1. MOTIVATION
Understanding wage differentials is at the core of labor economics. At least since
Adam Smith wrote on wages in the different employments of labor in chapter X of
book I of his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations back in
1776 we know that on competitive labor markets personal characteristics (e.g.,
human capital) and job characteristics (working conditions that demand
compensating wage differentials) matter. More recently it has been pointed out that
characteristics of the employer (i.e., of the work place
1) do matter, too. These firm
characteristics include size (Oi and Idson 1999), industry (Krueger and Summers
1988), regional location (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994) and, at least in some
countries, unionization (Lewis 1986).
An emerging literature suggests that there is another firm characteristic which plays a
role in determining the individual wage, namely firm age, i.e. the time span an
employer has been in business. Summarizing the literature from labor economics,
Brown and Medoff (2001) discuss the following reasons why we might expect that
wages are linked to firm age:
•  Worker quality: Workers in newly established firms cannot have high levels of
tenure, and workers in older firms are likely to have more overall experience,
too. Firm age and wage, therefore, can be expected to be positively related.
•  Firm age and survival: Younger firms are much more likely to expire than older
ones, and prospective job loss can be regarded as a negative job characteristic
demanding a compensation. According to this line of reasoning, firm age and
wage can be expected to be negatively related.
•  Fringe benefits: Pension plans and health insurance are more often offered by
older firms, and these benefits might be considered as substitutes for high
wages by workers of a given quality in older firms (leading to a negatively
shaped firm age - wage nexus).
•  Ability to pay: As Brown and Medoff (2001, p. 7) put it, any claim of inability to
pay higher wages is much more credible (and, therefore, more often accepted
by the workers) when made by a new firm whose long-run existence is in doubt
than when made by a long-surviving firm.
1 We will speak of the work place as a firm in this paper irrespective of its legal form. In our empirical
investigation we will use data collected at the level of the local production unit, or establishment,
and we will take care of differences between branch plants and single plant establishments.4
The discussion of theoretical links between firm age and wages clearly shows that it
is important to control for worker characteristics and other firm characteristics in an
empirical study that looks for a firm age - wage differential and its size. Empirical
evidence showing that in the U.S. firms that have been in business longer pay higher
wages, however, is based on data sets for employers only which do not allow to
control for characteristics of the employees and in which information about the
employer other than age, size, and industry is rather scarce, too (for a survey, see
Brown and Medoff 2001). In a comprehensive recent empirical study using U.S. data
from a survey of employees augmented by information from a credit rating agency
Brown and Medoff (2001) find that firms that have been in business longer pay higher
wages, but pay if anything lower wages after controlling for worker characteristics.
However, the Brown and Medoff study (which is the best empiricial investigation
hitherto published on this topic) is based on a quite small sample of 1,410 workers
only, and information on both worker and firm characteristics is rather limited.
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first empirical evidence on
the firm age - wage nexus for Germany
2 based on a unique and rich data set which
links comprehensive information of 2,796 establishments from western Germany to
detailed individual level information on all its employees (covered by social
insurance) in 1996, using data of 907,823 workers. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: Section 2 introduces the linked employer-employee data, section 3
reports raw differentials in median wages for establishments from three size classes
and for four broad groups of employees with different degrees of formal qualification,
section 4 gives results on firm age - wage differentials from wage regressions
controlling for a large number of individual and firm level characteristics, section 5
discusses the role played by collective bargaining, and section 6 concludes.
2. THE MATCHED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA
The use of matched employer-employee data has recently become popular as it
allows a more detailed analysis of economic relationships. In particular, various
analyses of the labor market can benefit from the availability of employer-employee
data.
3 In this paper, we use the LIAB, which combines the employment statistics of
2 We are only aware of one paper that touches upon this question based on German data: Bellmann
and Kohaut (1999) use data for 2,670 (2,392) establishments from western (eastern) Germany to
estimate wage regressions with the average wage in 1996 as the endogenous variable. Their
empirical model includes a dummy variable for new firms (founded after 1994). The estimated
regression coefficient for this dummy is negative in both models, but only marginally significant (at
an error level of 10 percent) for western Germany and insignificant at any conventional level for
eastern Germany.
3 A survey of matched employer-employee data sets can be found in Abowd and Kramarz (1999).5
the German Federal Labor Services with plant level data from the IAB-Establishment
Panel.
The employment statistics (cf. Bender, Haas and Klose 2000) cover all employees
and trainees subject to social security and exclude, among others, a part of the civil
servants (“Beamte”), the self-employed, family workers, students enrolled in higher
education and those in marginal employment. The employment statistics cover nearly
80% of all employed persons in western Germany and about 85% in eastern
Germany.
The employment statistics are collected by the social insurance institutions for their
purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973 and are made available to the
Federal Employment Services. Notifications are prescribed at the beginning and at
the end of a person's employment in a plant. In addition an annual report for each
employee is compulsory at the end of a year. Misreporting is legally sanctioned. The
employment statistics contain information on an employee's occupation, the
occupational status and gross earnings up to the contribution assessment ceiling and
on individual characteristics like sex, age, nationality, marital status, number of
children and qualification. Each personnel record also contains the establishment
identifier, the industry and the size of the plant.
Starting in 1993, the IAB-Establishment Panel (cf. Kölling 2000) is drawn from a
stratified sample of the plants included in the employment statistics, where the strata
are defined over industries and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled), but the
sampling within each cell is random. In 1993, the sample started with 4,265 plants,
covering 0.27% of all plants in western Germany (2 million) and 11% of total
employment (29 million). In 1996, the eastern German establishment panel started
with 4,313 establishments representing 1.10% of all plants (391 thousand) and 11%
of total employment (6 million). Altogether, the number of establishments interviewed
increased until the year 2001 up to 15,000, in order to make regional analysis on the
federal state level feasible.
The IAB-Establishment Panel is created for the needs of the Federal Labor Services
to provide further and detailed information about the demand side of the labor
market. Therefore, information on the composition of the workforce and its
development through time constitutes a major part of the questionnaire. Further
questions include training, working time, business activities and establishment
policies. Other topics, for instance, questions on innovations or flexibility of labor, are
asked biannually or triannually. In addition, each annual wave provides information6
on particular topics; in 2000, for example, this has been the lack of skilled
employees.
The LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics and the IAB-Establishment
Panel through a plant identifier which is available in both data sets.
4 This matched
employer-employee data-set, which is unique for Germany, comprises currently the
years 1993-1997. For our purposes we use data from 1996, where it is possible to
identify the year of plant formation for each firm. We exclude establishments that are
located in the eastern part of Germany since the economic situation (and the level of
wages) in post-communist eastern Germany still differs considerably from that in
western Germany. Also, non-profit organizations and public firms are dropped from
the sample for similar reasons. Therefore, in the regressions we end up with a
sample of 907,823 observations of employees from 2,796 establishments.
3. ESTABLISHMENT AGE AND AVERAGE WAGES
As a first step in our empirical investigation of the relationship between establishment
age and wage we look at differences in average wages in firms from three age
cohorts. Information on the founding year of an establishment is taken from the IAB-
Establishment Panel. Firms that started to operate in 1985 or before and, therefore,
have been in business at least eleven years in 1996, form the group of old firms
(termed cohort A in Table 1). Firms that were six to ten years old in 1996 (founded
between 1986 and 1990, i.e. in the years just before German re-unification) are
considered to be younger firms (cohort B), and firms founded in 1991 or later are
named new firms (cohort C).
Given that wages tend to be closely related to formal qualification of the employees,
we sort the employees in each establishment into four broadly defined groups, using
information from the statistics of workers covered by social insurance: Employees
without a high school degree and without industrial training (group 1), employees
without a high school degree and with industrial training (group 2), employees with a
high school degree and without a degree from a university (group 3), and employees
with a university degree (group 4).
For each of the three firm age cohorts and each of the four qualification groups we
computed the average of the employees’ median daily wage (measured in Pfennige:
100 Pfennige = 1 DM) in 1996. We use the median (instead of the mean) because
4 Both data sets are confidential but not exclusive. Those interested in using the data for scientific
(non-commercial) research should contact the first author at arnd.koelling@iab.de.7
wages are only reported correctly up to the contribution assessment ceiling of the
social security system. Since higher earnings are truncated at the ceiling in our data
set, mean daily wages based on reported wages would be biased downwards.
5
Results for each of the four qualification groups by the three age cohorts are reported
in Table 1.
[Table 1 near here]
It turns out that old firms pay higher wages on average than both younger firms and
new firms, and this difference is statistically significant at an error level of ten percent
or better for all qualification groups. Furthermore, at least some of the computed
average differences in wages between the cohorts are of an order of magnitude that
matters economically, too. For example, an employee from group 2 earns on average
17.69 DM per day more in an old firm compared to a younger firm, and this amounts
to some 371 DM in a month with 21 working days.
6
In the second step of our empirical investigation we move from the establishment
level to the individual level. We estimated wage equations for individuals from each
of the four broad qualification groups regressing the log of daily individual wages on
dummy variables for younger firms and new firms,u s i n gold firms as a reference
group. The recorded earnings variable in our data is censored at the maximum that
was taxable under social security; that is, anyone earning more than this maximum is
recorded as having earned the maximum. Standard ordinary least squares
regression using censored data will typically result in coefficient estimates that are
biased toward zero. Therefore, we used a Tobit-type estimator. We have more than
one observation (in fact, sometimes hundreds of observations) from one
establishment, and while the observations can be considered to be independent
across firms this is not the case within a local production unit. This has to be taken
care of when estimating the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators. To do so,
we used the cluster option of the intreg-estimator provided in Stata.
7 The estimated
regression coefficients give point estimates of differentials in average wages between
age cohorts. Furthermore, we performed this exercise separately for male and female
employees. Results are reported in Table 2.
5 Note that we excluded establishments from the public sector and non-profit organizations.
Furthermore, employees with a daily wage of less than DM 60 were excluded because the reported
earnings seem unreliably low.
6 Contrary to this, new firms from the cohort 1991 to 1995 tend to pay more than younger firms
founded between 1986 and 1990. Again, most of these differences are statistically significant, and
economically relevant, too.
7 Stata Release 7.0 was used to compute the regression models in this and the following sections.8
[Table 2 near here]
Almost all (22 of 24) estimated regression coefficients for the age cohort dummies
have a negative sign, indicating that old firms pay more. However, only five of these
are statistically different from zero at a conventional error level. Given the large
samples used to estimate the wage regressions and the low values of the t-statistics
reported, therefore, evidence for a positive relationship between establishment age
and wages is at best weak.
4. ESTABLISHMENT AGE AND INDIVIDUAL WAGES
It has been argued in the introductory section that it is important to control for other
characteristics of the firm besides age, and for characteristics of the employees, in
any empirical study on the (non)existence of a firm age - wage nexus. To do so in
this section we will look at the results from wage regressions. The dependent
variable is the log of the daily wage. Independent variables include the age of the
employee (plus its square) to proxy experience; four categories of the employees'
professional status (using unskilled blue collar workers as the reference group);
dummy variables indicating whether or not a person is married, and German; detailed
information on the structure of the workforce in the establishment (percentage shares
of employees who are females, foreigners, have a university degree, are part-time
workers or workers with a fixed-length contract, or trainees) and labor turnover
(percentages of hires and layoffs during the first half of 1996); an indicator for the
economic performance of the firm (bad, average, good); dummy variables indicating
whether or not the firm used overtime work, shift work, is covered by collective
bargaining agreements, uses the latest technology, and invested in information and
communication technology; firm size (and its square); a dummy for single-
establishment enterprises; information on the legal form of the firm; detailed controls
for the profession of the employee (84 categories); 15 dummies for industries; nine
dummies for federal states; and two dummies for the firm age cohorts younger firms
and new firms. The empirical models were estimated for each of the four broad
qualification groups. We computed the models for male and female employees
together (adding a sex dummy) and separately. Results are reported in Tables 3 to
5.
8
[Tables 3 to 5 near here]
8 Detailed descriptive statistics are given in an appendix that is available on request.9
All independent variables besides the age cohort dummies are included here only to
control for "other characteristics of the employer and the employee".
9 Although in
interpreting the results we will not be able to comment on all the estimated regression
coefficients for these control variables, some comments on the results in Table 3 are
in order. For all four groups of workers it can be seen that individual characteristics
play an important role: wages increase significantly with the age of employees (albeit
with a decreasing rate), they are higher for men and lower for foreign workers, and
they are affected by the professional status of employees. In contrast, not all
establishment characteristics prove to be significant, but the composition of the
workforce, a good economic performance of the establishment and (at least for some
groups) the size and the legal form of the establishment seem to play a role for
wages.
From the estimated regression coefficients for the dummy variables identifying a
younger firm and a new firm we can conclude that ceteris paribus old firms do not
pay higher wages. If anything, the opposite is the case. In Tables 3 to 5 all but one
coefficients have a positive sign, and in the wage regressions for female employees
these are significantly different from zero at an error level of five percent or better for
two of the four broad qualification groups. To put it differently, controlling for a wide
range of employer and employee characteristics wipes out any hints to a positive
nexus between firm age and wages stemming from simple descriptives.
5. ESTABLISHMENT AGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND WAGES
Some readers who followed our analysis up to this point might be tempted to argue
that this result – the absence of a positive firm age - wage nexus in Germany – is
exactly what they expected, because the process of wage determination in Germany
is dominated by collective bargaining between labor unions on the one hand and
employers' associations (or single employers) on the other hand, and the resulting
collective agreements do never consider the age of the firm to be a relevant variable.
9 Selection of control variables was limited by the information available in the linked employer-
employee data set for 1996. Our specification illustrates that this is really a rich data set.
Unfortunately, however, we are unable to control for length of tenure with the current employer, for
fringe benefits (pensions) and profit sharing, and for (un)pleasant working conditions. But as The
Rolling Stones once put it, you can't always get what you want. Note that there is no such thing as
a unionized establishment in Germany, so there is no need to control for this. The role of coverage
by collective bargaining agreements, however, will be discussed in detail in the next section.10
However, it should not be overlooked that not all firms and not all employees are
covered by collective agreements. An empirical study by Bellmann, Kohaut and
Schnabel (1999) based on representative data for the private sector from the IAB-
Establishment Panel shows that in 1997 just 49% of establishments in western
Germany were covered by sectoral (i.e. industry-wide) collective agreements, and
these agreements applied to 65% of employees. The collectively agreed wages are
minimum terms, and companies bound by sectoral agreements may not undercut
these minimum wages (unless they can make use of an “opening clause” and get
special permission by the labor union to reduce wages, e.g. in order to save jobs in
cases of emergency). Companies are free, however, to improve upon these minimum
conditions and pay higher wages, fringe benefits etc. Representative data from the
IAB-Establishment Panel show that in 1997 about 49% of private western German
firms bound by sectoral agreements paid more than the collective contract wage, the
average wage premium being 11% (Kohaut and Schnabel 1998).
These wage premiums (as well as the cuts in sectoral contract wages in firms
invoking an “opening clause”) could well be related to the age of the establishment,
and being bound or not by a collective agreement may make a difference for
company wage policy. In order to test whether the establishment age - wage nexus
differs between firms that are covered by collective bargaining or not, the regression
models discussed in detail in section 4 above were estimated separately for three
groups of firms: firms covered by a sectoral agreement at the industry level, firms
with an agreement on the firm or establishment level, and firms not covered by a
collective agreement (see Table 6).
[Table 6 near here]
The results reported in Tables 3 to 5 showed that firms bound by collective
agreements have to pay significantly higher wages for low-skilled workers (group 1)
than other firms. Taking into account different regimes of collective bargaining,
however, does not change our conclusions concerning the establishment age – wage
nexus. In Table 6 the estimated regression coefficients for the dummy variables
identifying a younger firm and a new firm are never negative and significant, and they
are seldom positive and significant. This means that ceteris paribus old firms do not
pay higher wages; if anything, the opposite is the case. More importantly, in this
respect firms do not behave differently when they are not bound by a collective
agreement.11
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on a unique rich set of linked employer-employee data this paper presents the
first empirical evidence on the firm age - wage nexus for Germany. We find that older
firms pay on average higher wages for workers with the same broadly defined degree
of formal qualification. This firm age differential, however, vanishes after controlling
for further worker characteristics and other firm characteristics besides age. Detailed
regression analyses suggest that, if anything, younger firms pay more ceteris
paribus. These results are in line with findings from a recent study by Brown and
Medoff (2001) using U.S. data.
Our findings are consistent with the line of reasoning pointing to the higher risk of
failure of young firms and the need to compensate employees in these firms for their
higher risk of job loss. Furthermore, they might be linked to the fact that certain kinds
of fringe benefits which can be substitutes for higher wages (e.g. pension plans or
profit sharing schemes) - and which we are unable to control for in our empirical
models due to lack of information in the data used - are more often found in older
firms. Our results (and the open questions just mentioned) show that it is important to
use the new generation of linked employer-employee data for empirical investigations
related to both the supply and the demand side of the labor market.12
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A vs. B +++ +++ ++ +++
A vs. C +++ +++ +++ +
B vs. C -- -- (-) --
Note: For a precise definition of groups, see also text. Values in the upper part of the table are
average median wages per establishment in the respective group and cohort. The number of
establishments is given in parenthesis. The lower part of the table reports the results of t-tests
on differences between average median wages (unequal distribution of variances). The signs
indicate differences to the cohorts with younger establishments: If older establishments pay
more (less) than younger ones, a + (-) is shown in the tables, the number of + or - indicates
the level of significance (three signs: 1%, two signs: 5%, one sign: 10%), insignificant
differences are presented in parentheses.Table 2: Tobit regressions of individual remuneration
(endogenous variable: log. wage per day in DM/100, recognition of establishment clusters, parsimonious model, definition of groups see text)
Overall Men Women




































































































Number of establishm. 1788 2646 1416 1428 1616 2424 1279 1377 1345 2287 1042 902
Source:LIAB 1996. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. * resp. ** (***) indicate a level of significance of 10% resp. 5% (1%).Table 3: Tobit regressions of individual remuneration
(endogenous variable: log. wage per day in DM/100, recognition of establishment
clusters, full model, definition of groups see text)
Groups


































(reference: unskilled blue collar worker)







































































































































Variables 1 2 3 4
















Collective agreement (reference: no
collective agreement)
























Investment in information and





































































Year of establishment formation
(reference: 1985 and before)
















84 dummies for individual profession yes yes yes yes
9 dummies for federal states yes yes yes yes
15 dummies for industries yes yes yes yes
Number of observations (censored) 173854 (2046) 599182 (53639) 40122 (7717) 94665 (54102)
Number of establishments 1788 2646 1416 1428
Source:LIAB 1996. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * resp. ** (***) indicate
a level of significance of 10% resp. 5% (1%).Table 4: Tobit regressions of individual remuneration of men
(endogenous variable: log. wage per day in DM/100, recognition of establishment
clusters, full model, definition of groups see text)
Groups


























(reference: unskilled blue collar worker)







































































































































Variables 1 2 3 4
















Collective agreement (reference: no
collective agreement)
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Year of establishment formation
(reference: 1985 and before)
















84 dummies for individual profession yes yes yes yes
9 dummies for federal states yes yes yes yes
15 dummies for industries yes yes yes yes
Number of observations (censored) 119996 (1711) 492805 (50876) 24741 (6795) 84228 (51569)
Number of establishments 1616 2424 1279 1377
Source:LIAB 1996. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * resp. ** (***) indicate
a level of significance of 10% resp. 5% (1%).Table 5: Tobit regressions of individual remuneration of women
(endogenous variable: log. wage per day in DM/100, recognition of establishment
clusters, full model, definition of groups, see text)
Groups


























(reference: unskilled blue collar worker)
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collective agreement)
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Year of establishment formation
(reference: 1985 and before)
















84 dummies for individual profession yes yes yes yes
9 dummies for federal states yes yes yes yes
15 dummies for industries yes yes yes yes
Number of observations (censored) 53858 (335) 106377 (2763) 15381 (922) 10437 (2533)
Number of establishments 1345 2287 1042 902
Source:LIAB 1996. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * resp. ** (***) indicate
a level of significance of 10% resp. 5% (1%).Table 6: Tobit regressions of individual remuneration according to collective agreement status
(endogenous variable: log. wage per day in DM/100, recognition of establishment clusters, full model, definition of groups, see text)















































































































































































































































































































































Collective agreement on sectoral level Collective agreement on firm level No collective agreement
Groups



















































































































































































































































































































































Collective agreement on regional or industry
level



























































































































































84 dummies for individual
profession
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
9 dummies for federal
states
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes



























Number of establishments 1405 1892 1089 1102 189 280 148 150 194 474 179 176
Source:LIAB 1996. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * resp. ** (***) indicate a level of significance of 10% resp. 5% (1%).APPENDIX
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (definition of groups see text)
Groups
1234
173,854 observations 599,182 observations 40,122 observations 94,665 observations
Variables mean s. d. mean s. d. mean s. d. mean s. d.
Daily wage in Pfennige (log.) 9.61 0.23 9.80 0.25 9.88 0.27 10.10 0.14
Age (log.) 3.70 0.26 3.64 0.27 3.52 0.25 3.68 0.22
Sex (1 = male) 0.69 0.46 0.82 0.38 0.62 0.49 0.89 0.31
Marriage (1 = yes) 0.65 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.63 0.48
Nationality (1 = foreigner) 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Proportion of female workers in establishment 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.22 0.15
Prop. of German workers in establishment 0.84 0.11 0.90 0.09 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.09
Prop. of workers with university degree in est. 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18
Proportion of part-time workers in establishment 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06
Proportion of fixed-term workers in establishment 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
Proportion of industrial trainees in establishment 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Prop. of hires in the first half year of 1996 in est. 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
Prop. of layoffs in the first half year of 1996 in est. 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
Overtime work in establishment (1 = yes) 0.88 0.33 0.90 0.30 0.91 0.28 0.92 0.27
Shift work in establishment (1 = yes) 0.91 0.29 0.87 0.34 0.76 0.43 0.81 0.39
Collective agreement on sectoral level (1 = yes) 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.86 0.34
Collective agreement on firm level (1 = yes) 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25
Use of newest technology (1 = yes) 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45
Investment in ICT (1 = yes) 0.75 0.43 0.79 0.41 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.35
Number of employees in establishment 7.28 1.28 7.38 1.36 7.41 1.21 7.58 1.17
Single establishment firm (1 = yes) 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39
Source: LIAB 1996Table A.2: Distribution of Employees (definition of groups see text)
Groups
1234
Number of employees / %
Year of establishment
formation
1985 and before 162,097 19.15 558,525 65.98 37,108 4.38 88,821 10.49
1986 - 1990 3,097 18.48 11,667 69.62 887 5.29 1,107 6.61
1991 - 1995 8,660 19.45 28,990 65.13 2,127 4.78 4,737 10.64
Total 173,892 19.15 599,318 66.00 40,132 4.42 94,682 10.43
Professional Status
Unsk. blue collar worker 131,569 75.68 132,980 22.19 1,904 4.75 301 0.32
Skilled blue collar
worker
24,451 14.06 215,859 36.03 1,475 3.68 251 0.27
Master craftsmen,
foreman
698 0.40 18,745 3.13 299 0.75 313 0.33
White collar workers 17,136 9.86 231,598 38.65 36,444 90.83 93,800 99.09








7,586 4.36 41,752 6.97 1,422 3.54 4,344 4.59
Manufacturing of
primary goods
45,569 26.21 115,689 19.31 6,811 16.98 18,037 19.05
Manufacturing of
investment goods
80,696 46.42 278,634 46.5 11,335 28.25 46,631 49.26
Manufacturing of
consumer goods
17,030 9.80 34,219 5.71 1,640 4.09 2,371 2.5
Construction 2,343 1.35 10,929 1.82 249 0.62 1,049 1.11
Wholesale and retail
trade
5,417 3.12 34,090 5.69 2,929 7.3 3,979 4.2
Transport, storage and
communication
4,931 2.84 19,963 3.33 665 1.66 1,015 1.07
Monetary intermediation 3,037 1.75 23,775 3.97 7,975 19.88 5,540 5.85
Insurance and pension
funding
1,327 0.76 13,738 2.29 3,867 9.64 3,411 3.6
Hotels, restaurants,
laundries, barbers
1,092 0.63 3,052 0.51 267 0.67 137 0.14
Education, publishing 796 0.46 5,246 0.88 1,197 2.98 1,398 1.48
Human and veterinary
health activities
1,357 0.78 8,469 1.41 500 1.25 472 0.5
Miscellaneous services
1 1,490 0.86 6,617 1.1 1,002 2.5 5,934 6.27
Other personal services 1,078 0.62 2,573 0.43 193 0.48 312 0.33
Total 173,854 100 599,182 100 40,122 100 94,665 100
1 Real estate, renting, business activities, other community and social activities.Still Table A.2
Groups
1234
Number of employees / %
Federal State
Berlin (West) 6,962 4.00 27,384 4.57 3,372 8.40 4,923 5.20
Schleswig-Holstein 2,651 1.52 11,642 1.94 555 1.38 1,481 1.56
Hamburg 9,588 5.51 36,093 6.02 5,034 12.55 7,929 8.38
Niedersachsen 13,963 8.03 56,466 9.42 2,477 6.17 5,162 5.45
Bremen 1,077 0.62 13,135 2.19 1,016 2.53 2,413 2.55
Nordrhein-Westfalen 52,454 30.17 160,342 26.76 10,550 26.29 23,326 24.64
Hessen 10,777 6.20 46,733 7.80 5,072 12.64 11,777 12.44
Rheinland-Pfalz /
Saarland
10,810 6.22 32,293 5.39 1,275 3.18 2,405 2.54
Baden-Württemberg 29,143 16.76 93,698 15.64 6,488 16.17 21,093 22.28
Bayern 36,429 20.95 121,396 20.26 4,283 10.67 14,156 14.95
Total 173,854 100 599,182 100 40,122 100 94,665 100
Legal form
Individual enterprises 1,585 0.91 4,988 0.83 109 0.27 167 0.18
Partnerships 17,564 10.10 46,361 7.74 2,176 5.42 4,516 4.77
Limited companies 81,802 47.05 249,381 41.62 12,837 31.99 37,939 40.08
Incorporated companies 70,835 40.74 287,435 47.97 23,177 57.77 50,754 53.61
Other legal forms 2,068 1.19 11,017 1.84 1,823 4.54 1,289 1.36
Total 173,854 100 599,182 100 40,122 100 94,665 100
Economic performance
Bad 78,165 44.96 247,528 41.31 10,101 25.18 33,863 35.77
Average 91,243 52.48 331,864 55.39 27,066 67.46 53,771 56.80
Good 4,446 2.56 19,790 3.30 2,955 7.37 7,031 7.43
Total 173,854 100 599,182 100 40,122 100 94,665 100
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